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Summary findings
Recent debate  about  how timber prices affect  v  A fee on land used for logging is preferable to a tax
deforestation  has focused mainly on how log export bans  on timber  output,  which  is far more common  but
(imposed in many developing  countries to protect  encourages logging waste.
domestic timber  processing) affect deforestation.  - Technological  interventions  that  increase the
One side argues  that the lower domestic timber  prices  intensity of foresrry or alternative  land  uses are an
that  result from banning  log exports  increase  ambiguous  instrument  for the conservation  of
deforestation  by making forcstry less profitable  than  unmanaged  forests.
competing  land uses, such as agriculture.  The other  *  If demand elasticity for outputs  is high, an
argues that  lower  timber prices reduce profits  from  intervention  that increases the intensity or agriculture,
logging, so they slow down  deforestation  caused by  logging, or other land uses increases incei.tives for
logging.  conversion  of unmanaged  forests. The building of roads
Von Amsberg argues that the conflicting  views result  is particularly  harmful to the  conservation  of unmanaged
from simplistic analysis that ignores differences  between  forests, as it increases incentives for logging and
types  of forest.  The two positions are reconciled by  subsequent  a:ternative  land  uses.
distinguishing between  unmanaged  forests (for exarnple,  *  Proper pricing of forest lands would  increase land
biologically mature,  previously unlogged  primary  forests)  prices and lead to market-driven  intensification
and managed  forests (such as foresr plantarions  cultivated  accompanied  by forest prorection.  Such pricing policies
for periodic harvest). This distinction  allows the  would  bc preferable  to a technological  intervention  that
derivation  of unambiguous  comparative  static results and  increases land use intensity  with ambiguous outcomes  for
is useful because many nontimber  benefits from  forests  forest protection.
(such as biodiversity conservation)  are associated mainly  - If unmanaged  forest is converned to agriculture,  the
with unmanaged  forests.  effect of lowering the decisionmaker's  discount  rate
The distinction  between  managed and  unmanaged  depends  on the size of timber  rents from  logging
forests leads to both  unconventional  and conventional  unmanaged  forests. If the standing  timber has high
results:  commercial  value, a lower discount  rare would  slow
- All things being equal, a lower timber price results  conversion of unmanaged  forests. If the standing timber
in larger  areas of unmanaged  forests and  smaller areas of  has no commercial value, logging is an investment  for
managed  forests. That  is, measures that  reduce the  obtaining  furure benefits of alternative  land  use  A lower
producer price for timber (for cxample, import restrictions  discount  rate would stimulate  this investment and
in timber-consuming  'ountries  and export restrictions in  increase the conversion  of unmanaged  forests. Also, if
timber-producing  countries) are suitable as a seconid-best  unmanaged  forests are converted  to managed forests, a
policy to reduce the pressure on unmanaged forest  lower discount rate  can increase conversion  since profits
frontiers. Most logging in tropical forests occurs in  from  managed  forestry are  higher with a lower discount
unmanaged  forests, so the claim that trade restrictions  rate.
(such as log export bans) increase deforestation  is
inconsistent with profit-maximizing  land use.
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Summary
This  paper  addresses the question  of how changes in  economic parameters,  such
as  the  price  of  timber,  influence  land  use  patterns  over  time,  and  in  particular
deforestation rates. The recent debate about the influence of timber prices on deforestation
has been lively and has focussed primarily on the deforestation  effects of log-export bans,
which  were  imposed  by  many  developing  countries  in order  to  protect  their  domestic
timber  processing industry.  One  side in  this debate  claims that  a  reduction  in domestic
timber  prices, resulting for example from  a log export ban,  increases  deforestation  since
it makes forestry less profitable compared  to competing land uses such as agriculture. The
other side claims that  lower timber  prices reduce the profits from logging and  hence slow
down deforestation  resulting from  logging.
This  paper  argues  that  the  conflicting  views are  due  to  an  overly  simplistic
approach  that  ignores  the  differences  between  types of forests.  The  two  positions  are
reconciled  by explicidtly  distinguishing  between  unmanaged  forests, such  as biologically
mature  and  previously unlogged  primary  forests, and  managed  forests,  such as  forest
plantations,  which are cultivated for periodic harvesL This distinction allows the derivation
of some unxambiguous comparative  static results and  is useful because many non-imber
benefits from forests, such as biodiversity  conservation,  are to  a large  extent associated
with unmanaged  forests  only.
Drawing the distinction  between managed  and unmnaaged  forests leads to some
unconventional  results. The analysis shows that a lower timber price, ceteris paribus, leads
to  a larger  area  of unmanaged  forests but  a smaller  area  of managed  forests, and  vice
versa.  This result suggests that  measures to reduce the producer  price for timber  would
be suitable as a second  best policy to reduce the pressure on unmanaged  forest frontiers.
Such measures would include  import  restrictions  in the timber  consuming  countries,  as
wall as export restrictions in the timber producing countries. Since most logging in tropicalii  Economic  Parameters of Deforestation
countries occurs  in unmanaged forests, the daim that trade restrictions, such as log export
bans, increase deforestation is inconsistent with profit maximizing land use.
The effects  of changes in economic  parameters and economic  porlcies on land use
patterns over time are analyzed with a theoretical model and  a numerical simulation
model of land use. The results  support the conventional economic view that a fee on the
land used for logging is preferable to a  tax on the timber output, which is far more
common  but would  encourage  logging  waste.  Technological  interventions that increase  the
intensity of forestry or  alternative land uses (introduction of improved  technologies,
irrigation  infrastructure, etc.) are  shown  to  be  an  ambiguous  instrument  for  the
conservation of unmanaged forests.  f the  demand elasticity for  outputs is high,  an
intervention that increases  the intensity of agriculture,  logging,  or other land uses increases
incentives for conversion of unmanaged forests. The  building of roads is particularly
harmful to the conservation  of unmanaged forests since  it increases incentives  for logging
in two ways: it increases the profits not only of subsequent alternative land uses but also
of logging itself.
In contrast, proper pricing of forest lands would  increase land prices, and lead to
market  driven intensification that  is accompanied by forest protection.  Such pricing
policies would be preferable to  a  techmological  intervention that  increases land use
intensity with ambiguous  outcomes for forest  protection. If unmanaged forest is converted
to agriculture,  the effect  of lowering  the decision  maker's discount rate depends on the size
of timber  rents from  logging unmanaged  forests. If  the  standing  timber  has  high
commercial value, a lower discount rate would slow down conversion of unmanaged
forests. However,  if the standing timber has no commercial  value, logging  is an investment
for obtaining future benefits of alterative  land use. A lower discount rate would stimulate
this investment and increase the conversion of unmanaged forests. Also if unmanaged
forests are converted to managed forests, a lower discount rate can increase conversion
since profits from managed forestry are higher with a lower discount rate.Economic Parameters of Deforestation  1
1. Introduction
Large scale deforestation in tropical countries has become an issue of significant
intemational concern (see,  for example, FAO, 1993).  While the conversior of forest lands
to other uses is not necessarily  undesirable in every instance, there are strong economic
factors favouring inefficiently  excessive  deforestation. First, property rights to forests in
frontier areas are often not established  or not enforced. As a result, there is the excessive
depletion which is typical  for an open access  resource. Second,  even when property rights
are  established, forests provide numerous external benefits that  do not accrue to  the
owner, government forester, or other decision maker. These include regional and global
climatic stabilization,  soil conservation,  prevention of floods, preservation of biodiversity,
and non-timber products coliected  or hunted by members of local communities who do
not hold full ownership rights over the forest. Concems about deforestation focus on the
loss of these external benefits from natural forests.
In theory, one could devise  economic  instruments that would  overcome  the market
failures that lead to excessive  deforestation. Secure property rights could be established
and enforced to eliminate the open access problem. Exteral  benefits of forests could be
internalized by taxes on deforestation,  or subsidies  for the maintenance of forests equal in
amount to the external benefits. Such first-best economic policies  would lead to efficient
individual land use decisions  through the operation of market forces.  In practice, there are
many reasons why  first-best policies  are not applied. The establishment  and enforcement
of property rights are costly, sometimes more costly than  the value to be protected.
Efficient  logging taxes (as opposed to stumpage fees, which are assessed  not on the land
deforested but on timber removed) are almost unheard  of. Reasons for the absence of
efficient policies can  be  found in  national  political economy (e.g., better  political
representation of forest owners as opposed to the  beneficiaries of the  positive forest
externalities) or in the existence  of international extenalities (carbon sequestration and
biodiversity conservation).2  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
In the absence of first-best  policies,  the welfare  loss that arises  from market failures
in the forest sector is determined by the incentives,  prices and policies  in the economy at
large. For example, a forest area in a remote frontier region will remain forested as long
as transportation and  access costs are  so high  that  neither  the  rem6val of logs nor
agricultural activities on the land will generate a profit  However, changes in prices and
policies  that are unrelated to the forest sector may change this situation. The building of
a road or the devaluation of the national currency could reduce transport costs for logs
or increase revenues from agricultural crops up to the point where these activities  became
profitable and deforestation would occur.
As long as governments  do not implement  first-best  policies  for forest  management
and land use, two questions  arise. First, which policies  willtincrease  the welfare  loss arising
from excessive  deforestation?  Second, which second-best  policies can be implemented to
reduce the welfare  loss arising from excessive  deforestation?  In many cases, the effects  of
policies on  deforestation are  not  straightforward. As  a  result,  some  policies are
siultandeously claimed to reduce pressures  for deforestation and at the same time accused
of increasing deforestation.  Agricultural intensification, for example, is often  justified as
reducing pressures for deforestation since food requirements can  be met with smaller
cultivated  areas.  However,  others  claim  that  agriculturl  intensification increases
deforestation since it increases  profitability,  arAd,  hence, leads to agricultural expansion.
Similarly,  there are conflicting  views  on the basic questions  of whether an increase
in-  timber prices leads to increasing or decreasing deforestation. One view is that lower
timber prices reduce the profits from and the incentives for logging, and hence reduce
deforestation. The opposing view is that lower timber prices reduce the profitability of
forestry and  hence encourage the  conversion of forest lands to  other  uses such  as
agriculture (see  Vincent, 1990).  The effect  of timber price changes has particular relevance
for the controversial debate about the deforestation effect of log-export bans (LEBs),  o.
other trade restrictions which lower domestic timber prices.Economic  Parameters  of Deforestation  3
Deforestation  is a process during which land is converted from forests to other uses.
Deforestation  depends  on a large number  of economic parameters  such as the expected
time path  of the timber price, logging and  transport  costs, government  fees, the decision
makcers'  discount rate, and  the return  to alternative possible land uses. Many World Bank
supported  policies and projects impact directly and indirectly  on deforestation  processes.
Direct effects come from changes in the forest area through  reforestation  or dam projects.
While the valuation problems may be significant, at least the quantitative  impact on forest
area can be known in these cases. Indirect  effects of policies and  projects indulde change
input or output  prices for different land uses and  are more difficult to assess. Examples of
such impacts include the effects of road building, forest fee structure,  trade  policy, foreign
exchange  policy,  and  productivity  changes  in  the  forest  product  sector  as  well  as
agriculture.
Considering  the  growing  international  concern  about  deforestation,  there  is a
particularly  strong need for analytical work on these indirect  effects of policy changes on
deforestation.  In addressing the issue, this paper builds on a diverse literature  of relevance
for the analysis of land use dynamics. There is an extensive literature  examining the effects
of changes in various  economic parameters  on the optimal  management  of a forest (see
Jackson  1980, Chang  1983, Nautiyal  and  Williams  1990, and  the review in  Hyde  and
Newman  1991). These papers  use comparative  statics analysis to determine  the effect of
changes in production  costs, discount rate and various taxes on the optimal  rotation  age
and  the optimal management  intensity for a given forest. In these models, it is assumed
that  the land will be used for forestry in  perpetuity.
Static land-use  models analyze  the optimal use of land  at a given point  in time.
This  work was pioneered  by von Thiinen  (1826) and  applied  to forestry  by Ledyard  and
Moses (1974). Von Thiinen  introduces a bid-rent function and  suggests that a given piece
of land  is put  to the use in which it will yield the highest returns.  He  models rural  land
use in concentric  circles around  a city in which all goods are marketed.  The  increasing4  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
transportation costs from locations with  greater  distance from the  city will lead  to
decreasing  land value and decreasing  intensity of cultivation  until the land value decreases
to zero and an uncultivated wilderness begins.
The effect of timber price changes on land use has been explored in recent, less
formal, work which applies land  use models to  deforestation problems (Kishor and
Constantino 1993;  and Hyde, Amacher, and Magrath, 1993).  Barbier (1993)  uses a formal
model of renewable resource dynamics to analyze forest stock changes in response to
policy changes.  Several authors  have  analyzed  the  empirical  relationship between
economic  parameters and deforestation  (see  Barbier and Burgess, 1993; and Cropper and
Griffiths, 1994).  None of the previous work, however, has produced unambiguous and
fully  satisfying  results with regard to the directional impact of apparently simple changes,
such as a timber price drop, on deforestation.
The objective  of this papar is to provide an analytical  framework for determining
the indirect effects of policy changes on  deforestation. The  framework allows for the
systematic analysis and reconciliation of opposing views. While the  paper focusses on
analytical  tools  for evaluating the land-use effects  of policy  changes, it also provides some
results on the effects  of specific  policy  changes, such as the imposition of a log-export ban.,
on deforestation. Section 2 outlines the approach and the main results of the analysis.
Section 3 discusses  the policy implications. Chapters 4 and 5 contain the actual models
from which the results of the paper are derived.
Two methodological  approaches have been employed.  Section 4 contains a partial
equilibrium model of profit maximizing land use. This model is based on an exogenous
timber  price  path  with  the  assumption of a  delining  rate  of price  increase- This
assurmption  is consistent with empirical observation, and with the results from theoretical
models of  nonrenewable resource extraction  (timber from  unmanaged  forests) with
increasing extraction costs and a renewable back-stop technology (timber from managedEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  5
forests). This model is used to determine the direction of the effects of policy changes
when demand is totally elastic,  i.e. for timber exports of a small country. The main results
of this section are the comparative'  statics effects  of changes in the economic  parameters,
such as timber price or logging costs, on the profit maximizing time oflogging and the
optimal effort in logging.
Section 5 contains a simulation model of profit maximizing  land use in which the
timber price is endogenized. In  the market simulations, the price of timber rises at a
decreasing rate until a steady state is reached. The simulation of several policy changes
provides insights into the effccts  of policy changes when demand is not fully elastic, i.e.
for local fuclwood demand. Combined with site-specific  geographic and economic data,
the simulation model could bc used as a tool for analyzing future deforestation rates and
quantitative impacts of a specific  policy intervention.
2.  Modelling  Approach  and  Summary  of Results
This paper analyzes the links between economic parameters and  deforestation
through theoretical models based on profit maximizing agents. The models  are based on
the analysis  of the incentives  for the use of land in a specific  land class,  which includes all
lands with identical site-specific  characteristics.  While von Thiinen's work focusses  on the
central role of transpurtation costs,  other site-specific  determinants of land use include soil
quality, climatic conditions,  slopes,  road access,  factor costs, etc.. The models analyze how
economic parameters determine the incentives for land use in a given land class. The
ultimate interest, of course, is not in the individual land class but in aggregate land use
changes. However, aggregate changes are determined from changes in land use within
each class.  For example, if a policy  change leads to deforestation in some land clsses and
no reverse change in other land classes,  it can be concluded that the policy  change leads
to more aggregate deforestation.6  Economic  Parameters  of Deforestation
This  paper  integrates  the  land  use  and  forestry  litcraturc  by  using  fornal
comparative  staucs models similar to those in the traditional  forestrv literaturc  to analyzc
questions  of  land  use  dynamics.  It  diffcrs  from  previous  work  by  simultaneously
incorporating  two critical factors for understanding  dcforestaion  processis: the differences
between  types of forcsts and  the dynamic  naturc  of land  usc decisions involving forests.
Land  Bid Rent  Function
Land Rent
Agriculture  Managed  Unmanaged
Forest  Forest
Land Class  (Distance  from Market)
Land Rent: Agriculture  Land Rent: Managed Forest
Figure  1
First, the paper dearly  distinguishes between managed  and unmanaged  forests. In
unmanaged  forests,  net timber  growth  is zero since  decaying  timber  offsets concurrent
biological growth.  Logging of such a mature  forest  can be modelled like the  mining of a
non-renewable  resource  (see Lyon  1981). Unmanaged  forests  would  include  primary
forests and  second-growth  forests that  have not  been  logged for a long  time.  Managed
forests, on the other hand,  are logged after a fixed rotation  period. Managed  forests would
include  tree  plantations  and  other  forests  that  are  maintained  with  the  intention  ofEconomic Parameters  of Deforestation  7
periodic harvests. Agriculture  and managed  forests are both  seen as land uses competing
with unmanaged  forests. Following von Thiinen's  approach,  the use of land in one class
would be  determined  by relative profitability.  Figure  1 shows a  bid-rent  function  for a
situation  in  which  managed  forestry  would  be  located  between  agriculture  and  the
unmanaged  wilderness (see Hartwick,  1993, for a  similar approach).
In reality, there exist combinations of managed  and unmanaged  forests, and it may
be desirable  to  consider  those  in  a later  extension  to this  paper.  However,  the current
distinction  between  these  two  types  of forests  proves  useful because  it  leads  to  some
unambiguous  analytical  results. Moreover, many  external benefits, such as the provision
of habitat  and  the protection  of biodiversity, are associated with unmanaged  forests only.
Hence, if policy intervention  is justified  by the non-timber  benefits of a forest, its effects
on the extent of unmanaged  forests is more important  than the effect on aggregate forest
cover. To reflec.t  the ernphasis on old-growth  or unmanaged  forests, conversion or logging
refers  in  dtis  paper  to  die  conversion  of unmnanaged forests  to  other  uses,  including
managed  forests.
The  second  difference from  previous  work is that  this  paper  analyzes  land  use
changes  in  a  dynamic  context  A static  analysis based  on  a  comparison  of returns  to
different  land  uses  at  one  point  in  time  would  be  incomplete.  Rather,  the  relevant
comparison is between different land use patterns  through  time. The question is not only
whether deforestation  would occur on a given piece of land but also when it would occur.
It  will be shown  that,  for  cxample, the introduction  of forest plantations  could increase
deforestation  in  the  short  run  but  slow down deforestation  in  the  long  run  when  the
plantation  output  reaches  the market.  Similarly, an increase  in timber  prices may  have
different  effects depending  on how it changes the  fu-ture rate  of price  increases.  These
important  effects are ignored  in static models.8  Economic  Parameters  of Deforestation
In a dynamic  context, logging decisions depend  on not only current  prices but also
the expectation  about future prices. In this paper, certainty  and rational  expectations  are
assumed. Therefore,  in the absence of unanticipated  shocks, agents determine  their profit
maximizing  behaviour  in the first period for all times in the future, based on the expected
timber price path. There  is no difference between the expected and the realized price path
and the expected and realized behaviour.  A policy change  is an unanticipated  shock that
changes price  expectations, and,  therefore,  profit mnaximizing  behaviour.  The  analysis of
this paper focasses on the change  in behaviour  that  results from an unanticipated  policy
change.  Note  that  an  anticipated  change in  policy would not  change  behaviour.
As a result of geographic  conditions, deforestion  rates can increase  or decrease
over time without a change  in policy. These changes would be anticipated  in line with the
expected price and behaviour  path of a dynamic land use model. Since deforestation rates
can change without policy change-,  the relevant question for the analysis of the effect of
policy  changes,  is not  whether  deforestation  rates fall or  rise  after  a change  in  policy
occurs but whether deforestation rates are different from what they would have been if the
change  in  policy had  not  occurred.  Since,  for  obvious  reasons,  there  is no  empirical
information  available for a comparison  of the actual with the counterfactual  scenario,  this
type of anziysis is the natural  realm  of theoretical  modelling.
The two economic forces that drive deforestation are the timber value from logging
and  the returns  to alternative  land use after logging (farming, cattle ranching  or others).
In some cases, timber  use is not profitable and  deforestation  can dearly  be attributed  to
agricultural  expansion.  The forest is then simply burned.  In other cases, land is left fallow
after logging and deforestation  can clearly be attributed  to logging- However, logging and
future land use are non-exclusive. The  decision to convert unmanaged  forests is driven by
the  conversion profit  which is the  sum of profits from  logging and  all subsequent  land
uses. If timber  was not used or if land was left idle after logging, logging profits or profits
from  land use after logging, respectively, would be  ero or even negative.Economic Parameters of Deforestation  9
Under secure  property rights, the forest owner chooses  the optimal time for logging
by maximizing the present value of profits from logging and land use after logging. Of
course, there may also be lands on which logging is never profitable. Even with secure
property rights, non-timber benefits of the forests, such as climatic and'soil stabilization,
biodiversity  conservatior.,  and non-timber forest  products, are not intemalized. The model
with secure property rights is similarly applicable  where logging decisions  are made by a
government that cares about timber benefits  but ignores non-timber benefits of the forest.
Such goverment  behavior  appears reasonable  for a variety of reasons: In contrast to non-
timber benefits,  logging often generates government revenues from stumpage fees. Some
non-timber benefits  such as dimate and soil stabilization  will  accrue in the future, possibly
after the tenure of the current governmnent.  A concentrated logging industry can more
easily generate lobbying pressure on the govermnen;  compared to the less-organized
recipients of non-timber  benefits. Finally, some non-timber  benefits may  accrue as
international exteralities.
In contrast  to the secure  property rights situaton, an alternative scenario with open
access  to the forest  is analyzed.  In this scenario, deforestation  will occur at the earliest  time
at which the profits from logging are positive, If it is possible  to establish property rights
over the land by logging,  deforestation will occur as soon as the profits from logging plus
the present value of profits from all future land uses are positve.
The models deteriine  the optimal logging time for each land cla  for different
property  rights regimes and  different economic parameters.  Combining  the  profit
maximizing logging time for all casses, a picture of land use over time emerges (see for
example Figure 5). In good locations (in the simulation model designated by a low land
class index), agriculture is -elatively more profitable than forestry. Logging would begin
at the most favourable locaton  and, as the timber price rises, proceed to less favourable
locations. At a sufficiently  high timber price, managed forestry becomes profitable. Once
managed  forests have sufficiently expanded to  meet all  izmber demand,  logging of10  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
unmanaged  forests  ceases, the  timber  price  remains  stable,  and  the  steady  state
equilibrium is reached. Depending on the nature of the extraction costs compared to the
cost of managed forestry and the demand fo: timber, this can occur before or after all
unmanaged forests are logged.
The  theoretical model in section 4 determines under which conditions a policy
shock delays or advances logging in all land classes,  so that general statements about the
effect of such a shock can be made. The main result is that a drop in the level of the
timber price path leads to a delay of logging of unmanaged forests  in all land-classes.  This
result holds for open access with any logging technology as well as for secure property
rights with fixed coefficient  logging  technology. Even with varying logging effort, logging
of unmanaged forests is delayed under a technical condition on logging technology that
is shown to be reasonable. In all cases. the ultimately preserved quantity of unmanaged
fores  is the same or larg  under a lower timber pnce. The area of managed forc-s,  on
the other hand,  is reduced under lower timber prices. Some other comparative staics
results for the fixed coficient  model, with an exogenous  timber price path under secure
property rights, are summarized in Table L This table shows  the comparison of land use
at any time after a hypothetical shock between the with- and without-shock  scenanos.
Keeping in mnind  the distinction between unmanaged and managed forests, the
intuition of the main result is easily explained. The conflicting  views about the effects of
timber price changes on deforestation  arise  from the dual nature of forest land as a storage
of timber and  as an input to the production of timber. This paper reconciles the two
opposing  views  by analyzing the distinct impacts of timber price changes on different types
of forests, which are characterized by different  importance of land as storage of timber or
as  an  input  to  timber  production. A higher  timber  price  increases the  logging of
unmanaged forests which are storage of timber but which are not productive any more,
since they are mature. With higher timber prices, the logging  of more remote unmanaged
forests with  higher  site specific extracuon costs becomes profitable and  logging ofEconomic Parameters  of Deforestation  11
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unmanaged  forests increases.  On the other hand,  managed  forest lands  are producers  of
timber. A higher  timber  prce  increases the profitability  of timber  production  and  results
in more land being devoted  to timber  production.  As a resualt,  higher  timber  prices lead
to a smaller  area  of unmanaged  forest and  a larger  area  of managed  forest.12  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
3. Policy Implications
The analysis  in sections  4 and 5 provides  the methodology  for examining the effect
of policy choices on land use pattems  and deforestation. The  paper shows that it is
possible  to disentangle the complex economic  interactions  that lead to changes in land use
and deforestation. The main  instrument for obtaining some dear  comparative statics
results is the distinction between mining unmanaged forests that are biologically  mature
and managing production forests  for periodic replanting. The results are discussed  below
in the context of specific  policy  questions such as timber trade restrictions  and agricultural
policies.
Log Expor  Bans and Other Trade Restictons
Many timber exporting countries  have imposed  log-export bans (s)  or high log
export taxes at one stage or another (see Crossley,  1993).  LEBs were imposed primarily
with the objective of promoting domestic processing and the  export of higher valued
sawnwood or manufaured  goods. Even though LEEs were conceived as instruments of
infant industry protection, they have implications for logging rates and a lively debate
menters  on the environmental effects  of LEBs (see Goodland and Daly, 1994).  LEBs or
other trade restrictons as well as import boycotts reduce exxernal  log demand and have
the effect  of lowering log prices in the exporting country. Following  a log-export ban in
Costa Rica, for example, domestic log prices have fallen to 20-60 percent of international
prices (Kishor  and Constantino,  1993, p. 12).  The view that lower timber prices increase
deforsation is reflected  in many World Bank documents (see,  for example, 3randon and
Ramankutty, 1993, p37, and World Bank, 1993).
flispaperprovides  a djfferentiated  answru  to tke  question  wittier  lower timber
prices increase deforestation:  A  lower tin ber price patd reduces logging of  unmanaged
forests.  Mis resul keolds  under open access  as well as under secure  properfy  glits witlEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  13
fixed  logging technology.  The  additional  conditions  requiredfor  the result to hold  with
variabl  logging technology are skown  to be very likely.  Under any circumstances,  lower
timber prices increase the area of uxmanagedforest that wil remain after a steady-state
is reached in which al  timberproductiox  has  skjfted  to managedfeoreits. On tAe other
A  and, lower tib6erprices  kad to a reduced area ofmanagedforests.  Te  change in total
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Figure 2
Repetto, 1988, advances a second argument against log-export  bans, which is also
echoed in many World Bank documents (see Braga, 1992, and references above). The
claim  is  that  lower domestic log prices encourage wasteful logging and  processing
techniques and can, therefore, increase  logging. Undoubtedly, lower  log prices lead to less
efficienL  logging and processing. The second part of the argument, however, is flawed.
This can be shown in Flgure 2, which depicts the domestic market for logs. The supply14  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
of logs increases in log prices. This increase has at least three sources: an increase in
logging intensity on a given plot; an increase in unmanaged forest areas logged; and an
increase in the production of logs  from managed forests. Moving upward on the supply
curve, logging waste is reduced and logged unmanaged forest area is i-ncreascd.
P, is the export parity price of logs (in the absence of trade restrictions).  At this
price, the quantity of logs extracted is Q.  If a log export ban is imposed, the demand
curve for logs shifts downward if the domestic processing industry is less efficient than
international competitors.' The fact that processing efficiency  dedines with log prices (in
other words:  logs are substituted  for other inputs such as labor and capital)  is incorporated
in the demand curve, which  is flatter than it would ic without this effect? In any case, the
log export ban leads to a shift of the demand curve and along the supply curve. Since the
supply curve is positively  sloped, logging is reduced whenever a log export ban leads to
a lowering of the log price. Thus, while it is true that a log export ban can reduce logging
and processing  efficiency,  this reduced efficiencr cannot lead to an increase in the area
logged.
This main result has important policy implications,  not only for log export bans
but also for other policy interventions that reduce the producer price for logs. These
policies,  induding import restrictions  by log importing countries or consumer boycotts of
tropical timber, will  reduce the pressure  for logging  unmanaged forests  and therefore assist
the conservation of biodiversity  and other extemal benefits associated with unmarnaged
forests. On the other hand, the same measures  will  lead to reduced incentives  for managed
forestry and a decline in the area devoted to managed forests. Since the aggregate effect
On the other hand, if domestic prices were above export parity prices, a log export ban
would have no effect whatsoever since logs would not be exported in that situation even
without the ban.
2  The slope of the  domestic demand curve depends on the  structure of  the  domestic
processing industry and is irrelevant for the qualitative argument made here.Economic Parameters of Deforestation  15
on managed and unmanaged forest areas is ambiguous, no statement car be made about
the effect  on external benefits that are associated  with both types  of forests, such as carbon
sequestration. However, in FAO (1992),  it is estimated that  82 percent of the tropical
forest area  logged between  1931 and  1990 was in  previously unlogjed  (unmanaged)
forests. This observation suggests  a tentative conclusion that the positive effect of lower
timber prices on unmanaged forest conservation will offiet the negative effect  of reduced
managed forests.
The  analysis in  this  paper  indicates a  positive effect of  log-export bans  on
unmanaged forest conservation. However, this conclusion should not be misread as a
recommendation in  favor  of log export bans.  Lower log prices reduce logging and
processing efficiency, and  encourage logging waste. Log-export bans  or  other  trade
restrictions are  dearly  inferior to  the first-best policies for forest protection that  are
discussed  below. Their use as second-best  policy  instruments can be justified only if first-
best instruments are  impossible to  implement and  if the  benefits of reduced logging
outweigh  the efficiency  costs imposed on the economy as a result of price distortions- In
reality, many log-export bans are in place. The findings of this paper suggest  that before
these bans are removed, efficient first-best policies  for forest protection should be put in
place. Adverse effects on the unmanaged forests can be expected otherwise.
Agricultural Intensification, Plantation Forestry and Ocher Indirect Policies
Agricultural intensification  programs as well  as forest plantation projects are often
justified by the claim that they will  reduce the conversion  pressures  on natral  forests.  This
claim  can  be  analyzed within  the  conceptual framework suggested by  this  paper.
Agricultural improvements, such as increased yields from improved seed varieties or
changed cultural practices, can have different effects depending on the  nature of the
agricultural improvements and the elasticity  of demand for the products. If demand for
an agricultural product is very elastic (for example in  case of an export crop), and the16  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
benefits of intensification  apply to all lands, then intensification  would increase  the retums
to agriculture on any given piece of land. Hence, the area of agriculture would expand
at the expen.c of managed and unmanaged forestu.  In this case, agricultural progress
unambiguously increases deforestation. If agricultural intensification does not increase
returns to agriculture on currently forested lands (for example because irrigation systems
are installed on currently cultivated areas only), there would be no effect on forestry.
Only if the  demand for the  agricultural product is inelastic (for example for
subsistence agriculture),  would  agricultural improvements  lead to a reduction in the area
cultivated since the same agricultural output could be produced on a smaller area of land.
Then  pressures for deforestation would be reduced. The  question remains, however,
whether increased  productivity  in subsistence  agriculture would  not lead to expansion into
cash crop agricldture with higher demand elasdicity,  in which case pressures on forests
would increase again. To summarize, the claim that agricultural intensification  leads to
reduced pressure on forests can be rejected for export agriculture if improvements apply
to  all lands. In  the  case of subsistence agriculture, the  claim needs to  be  carefully
exammined  based on local conditions.
The introduction of  forest  plantations (managed  forests)  leads to a similar situation.
if demand for timber is highly elastic (the case of small timber-exporting countries), the
introduction of  plantation forests  creates additional pressures  for conversion  of unmanaged
forests since it would introduce an additional competing  land use. If demand for timber
is  inelastic (for  example  where timber supplies  fuelwood  for the local market), an offsetting
effect is introduced by forest plantations. In this case, increased timber supply from
plantations reduces  the timber price and, thus, reduces  the pressure to convert unmanaged
forests. As in the case of agriculture, demand for timber in a real-life situation would
neither  be fully elastic nor fully inelastic. Hence, the  resulting net  effect from the
introduction of plantations is ambiguous and depends on case-specific  demand elasticities.Economic Parameters of Deforestation  17
There are other policies that increase producer prices and would, thus, lead to
increased productivity of land use in either agriculture or managed forestry. In the case
of export goods, the  devaluation of the national  currency increases the  returns from
cultivation as well as the returns from logging unmanaged forests. Devaluation would
therefore  contribute to increased  conversion  of unmanaged forests.  Road building increases
the producer prices paid to farmers and forest owners, particularly in more remote and,
thierefore,  often unmanaged forest areas. Road building is, thus, particularly harmful to
the conservation  offorests,  increasing  the profitability  not only from alternative cultivation
but also from logging  itself. While increased producer prices reduce logging waste, they
also go along with more deforestation of unmanaged forests.
Measures that reduce decision makers' discount rates include the improvement of
access to  credit and increase in tenure  security. Lower discount rates unambiguously
increase the area of managed forests. The effect  on unmanaged forests  at the agricultural
margin depends on whether timber rents from unmanaged forests are positive or not
With positive timber rents, a lower discount rate will lead to an increase in unmanaged
forests.  With negative timber rents, however, logging  or land dletxing  is an investment that
is made for obtaining the benefits of alternative land use. A lower discount rate  wili
stimulate this investment and reduce unmanaged  forest areas. The  latter  situation is
reported from parts of the Brazilian  Amazon (see  Schneider 1993).  At the frontier between
unmanaged  and  managed forests, a  lower discount rate  can  also lead to  increased
conversion if the  increased returns  to  plantation  forestry outweigh the  reduction in
opportunity costs of the standing unmanaged forest (this  point was made in a static context
by Kishor and Constantines, 1993, p 11, and is consistent with the analysis in this paper).18  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
Efficient Forest Protection Policies
The  Frontier  of Unmanaged  Forest
ProfitslBenefits
Increasing  Remoteness  of  Location
Ext mal Bon-frts  conversion  Prefts  Conversion  Profits Conversion  Pirods
of  Unmgd  Forest  No Intervention  wit  LEB  with Agr Progress
Figure 3
The previous  section shows  that the increase in the technical cfFlciency  of forestry
and alternative land uses is a highly ambiguous tDol  for the conscrvation  of unrnanaged
forests. Whenever demand for a product from forests  or other Iand uses  is elastic (e.g.,  for
products with a broad market or many substitutes),  efficiency-increasing  interventions will
increase, not decrease, mining of unmanaged forests. The  conclusion is clearly that
increases in technological effidcincy  are a questionable tool for protecting forests.
Figure 3 demnonstrates  the change of land values and location of the unmanaged
forest  frontier wiath  different policy  intenventions  (see  Dixon, 1993,  for a similar approach).
The following  discussion  ignores dynamic aspects and second round effects.  Thesc would
change the size but not the signs  of the discusscd  effects.  Witout  policy  intervention, theEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  19
frontier of unmanaged forests  will  be at point B where the profits  from conversion (ogging
profits plus present value of profits from subsequent cultivation or managed forestry)
become zero. A log export ban or other policies  that depress log prices will reduce profits
from logging and lead to an inward shift of the frontier to point A (rmore  unmanaged
forest remains unlogged).  However, reduced timber prices also increase logging  waste and
reduce  processing efficiency. The  introduction  of improved  agricultural or  forestry
technologies will increase cultivation profits and has the opposite effect of a log export
ban: it will move the fronter  outward to point C.
Logging  is a production process in which  timber  land and cffort  are the inputs and
timber is the output. The policies discussed  above manipulate output demand (timber
demand) in order to influence the input demand for forest land. Policies to manipulate
output prices are common (the most common form of logging charges is a unit fee on
timber and not on forest land) but they distort price incentives and lead to allocational
inefficiencies:  if timber is taxed instead of forest land, the logging effort per unit of forest
would be reduced (ogging waste is increased). Based on  the  external benefits from
standing forests,  timber land is the underpriced resource that should be taxed. An efficient
policy  would charge a price for the conversion  of forest land equal to the extemal benefits
of unmanaged forests.  The frontier would  move to point D, where deforestation  is reduced
without  reducing land use efficiency  or increasing  logging  wastes.  As  a second  round effect,
efficient  pricing of unmanaged forest land would lead to an increase in land values, and
thus, to increased land use efficiency.
A first best policy of land conversion taxes equal to external benefits is
efficient, and  the benefits obviously outweigh the costs of such a policy. The  benefits,
however,  often  consist  of  diffuse,  non-monetary  (and  possibly  future),  welfare
improvements.  The costs, on the other hand are usually  foregone cash income.  Therefore,
it is important to consider the opportunity costs of an efficient forest protection policy.
Figure 4 can shed some light on these opportunity cost of forest protection.20  Economic Parameters of Deforestaion
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Figure  4  shows the  development of  profits from  logging  and  profits from
subsequent cultivation over time. Both are assumed to increase over time with improved
access, economic development and increasing timber prices. Until the time Tb, timber
revenues are lower than variable costs Qog  preparation and transport costs).  If the forest
is converted before T2 the timber will not be used but dleared and burned. The (negative)
logging profit up to T2 is simply the land dlaring  cost. If there is open access  to the forest,
and land dearing is a mechanism  for acquiring property rights, the  forest  will  be
converted as soon as the present value of conversion profits (logging profits plus cultivation
profits) is greater than zero. T, depicts the time at which conversion profits are equal to
zero.  flgure 4 shows  a situation  where  conversion  in the open access  cse  (IJ) will occurEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  21
before timber use becomes  profitable.  Hence, all timber will  be wasted.  In other situations,
some timber will be used even in the open access case.
If  secure property rights  over the  forest are  established before  conversion,
conversion  will occur not at the time of zero conversion  profits but at time, T,, at which
the present value of ronversion  profits  has its maximum.  Assuming  increasing  profits  from
logging and cultivation, conversion with secure property rights always takes place after
conversion  under open access.  Moreover, the delay of conversion  at T1 does not have an
opportunity cost at all, since the profits  from conversion  at Tt will  be zero. In fact, forest
rents are created by delaying  logging  until T, (the point that forest rents are creatd  only
by restricting access was made recently by Hyde, Amacher and Magrath, 1993).  Hence,
a  policy to  delay logging up until Ts  is not  only desirable from an  environmental
perspective but also creates tmber rents. Protection has an opportunity cost only once
conversion is delay,ed  beyond Ts.  Since timber prices are assumed to rise, this model
explains why logging intensity is higher under secure property rights than under open
access, and why, in fact, timber is often not used at all under open access.
There are two areas of important additional research that would strengthen the
analysis  in this paper. First, many of the parameter values that are used in the simuladons
could be estimated empirically  for areas which are ecologically  valuable "hot spots". This
would  allow  derivation  of quantitative  predictions  for specfic policy  interventions.  Second,
a model of a forest as a stock of homogenous timber is dearly unrealistic. In particular,
unmanaged forests consist of a variety of tree species with highly different economic
values. Even though some of tie  qualiaive  effects  of this heterogeneity of timber are
captured in the  production function for logging, a modelling approach doser  to the
physical  realities of a natural forest would  be desirable  and requires additional empirical
work.22  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
4. A Dynamic  Land  Use  Model  with  Exogenous  Timber  Prices
This section  contains the formal  model  of dynamic  land use with exogenous  timber
prices  and is divided  into three parts. In the first part, secure property rights and constant
effort  in logging  and managing forests  is assumed  (Leontief  technology).  Timber land and
"effnrt"  are the inputs to production, and timber is the output. Effort is an aggregate of
all inputs other than timber land, e.g. labor and capital.  The assumption  of constant effort
allows  the derivation  of many interesting  and unambiguous comparativec  statics  effects.  In
real forests,  however,  there is dearly some  substitutability  between timber land and efforL
Different  logging  intensities  can be observed  in logging  operations throughout the world.
Also, there is a wide literature examining the impacts of effort on the regeneration and
growth rate of timber. Therefore, the second part of this section relaxes the assumption
of  fixed effort  in logging  and managing forest  and shows  the conditions  on the production
functions  under which the comparative  statics  results from the constant effort model will
continue to hold. The third part of this section analyses a situation with open access to
unmanaged forests.
Constant Logging Effort
Consider the owner of a piece of land which is covered with unmanaged forest.
The owner maximizes  profits by choosing the optimal time for logging the forest and
possibly the  optmal  time for later  conversion of the  land from managed forest to
agriculture or vice versa. There is no return to the owner of an unmanaged forest until
it is logged. The following  notation will be used (superscripts  1,  f, and a refer to logging
unmanaged forests,  managed forests, and agriculture,  respectively,  superscript  c refers to
the profit maximizing land use after unmanaged: forest conversion, managed forest,
agriculture, or idle):Economic Parameters of Deforestation  23
LPV  the present value of one urnit  of land under the planned land use time path;
f'  the marketable timber stock  in unmanaged forests;
p,t)  the price path of timber,
k  an exogenous  shock to the timber price path;
tl  the time of logging unmanaged forest;
tl*  the profit maximizing logging  time;
the logging cost per land area
7ek,t)  the returns to logging unmanaged forest, i(,t)  = f'p(k,t)  - c-
f  the harvest rate of marketable timber in the managed forest;
cf  the cost of managing forests;
u  the fixed time period to maturity of managed forests;
7iQc,t)  the instantaneous retums to land in managed forestry,
iQct) = e  ffp(kt) - c;
7et)  the instantaneous retuns  to land under agriculture;
tc(k,t)  the instantaneous returns from profit maximizing land use after logging,
7flt)  = max[0,7{(t),7e(q);
r  the discount rate of the decision  maker.
All subscripts denote pardal derivatives.
For the timber price path, it is assumed  that p, > 0 and p. c  0. The assumption
of rising timber prices, and a decdining  rate of timber price increase is consistent  with a
situation in which timber from unmanaged forests  is depleted with rsing extraction costs
and a renewable  substitute  is available  in the form of timber from managed forests. These
price path assumptions are also supported by the market simulations  in section 5 which
yield  an endogenous price path with the characteristics  p, >  0 and p  <  03.
3  Strictly speaking, the less restrictive assumptions  p > 0 and p/Pt < r are sufficient for
obtaining  the main results derived in this section.  Note that the latter condition  is satisfied
for any  constant rate of  price increase less than the  discount rate, r.24  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
Consider two exogenous  shocks  to the timber price path: k' is an increase in the
level of the price pat  pc'  does noc change the slope of the price path). le' is some other
increase  in the timber price path, which  could alsorchange  its slope, for example, a value
tax on timber.  With these  assumptions,  the following  properties  result: 7e, > 0, 74 > 0,
7eO <  , 74t  C  0,  ARC =  0,  lede  r 0  i,>Ot  >  O,  i  ak  >  nd  4<  <  r  ando7e  f  C  0  ofits  from
agriculure are assumed to be independent of p, c', cJ,  and r. Furthermore, profits from
agriculure are assumed to be non-declining, te > 0.  For simplicity it is assumed that
managed forest produces a constant timber crop with residual instantaneous returns to
land of i7et).  'nis  model abstracts from the question of optimal effort and optimal
rotation periods in the managed forest and focusses  squarely on the question of land
conversion.  land  that is left idle after logging  yields zero returns.
The Optimal Logging Time
After unmanaged forest is logged, land use will be determined by maximizing
residual returns to land. The optimal time of logging  the unmanaged forest is determined
by maximizing  the present  value  of returns  fom  loggng and subsequent  profit-maximizing
cultivation  where s is the integration variable, running from the time of logging, te,  to
infinity
ma  LPV  = c"r' 21(U  + J-f  Csxc(ts)ds  (1)
subject to the condition max LPV > 0. If max LPV ￿0,  logging .would  not take place
within finite time. The first order condition is:
LPr,  aLp  e  =[4t1)r:ktt)-s'(tbl  =  0  (2)
where  subscripts  to a and LPV denote partial derivatives.  The intuition of this first order
condition is that at the optimal time of logging, the rate of appreciation of the timberEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  25
stock,  due to timber price increases,  must equal the foregone returns from logging as well
as altemative cultivation  of the land.
The effect of changes in the parameters on the optimal time of logging, t", is
determined by solving  the total derivatives  of (2) with respect to k, cl, and r for dt/dk,
dt'*/dc', and dtV/dr, respectively,  and simplifying  the results  with the first order condition:
&It  LPV_t  r_-r_c-_
?  LPY  TlkJ/+lYIt  c o  V
(3)
cit  LiPYr_  T2c-4 1 9
dt'*  LPVv  '  £
I  =~  - I12  >O  jf'i>
dt*  LPVr  I  Ic  i  I+% 
LPN  ZgTr2
Hence, on any piece of land an increase  in the level of the timber price pati  advances  the
profit  maxdmizing  logging  time. Logging  time is also advanced by any other positive  price
shocks  which either decrease the slope of the price path or increase the slope below the
value required for (3) to hold. If profits from logging are positive and greater than the
reduction in profits from land cultivation  with an increase in the discount rate, then an
increase in the discount rate advances deforestation.26  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
The Conversion Between Managed Forests and Agriculture
The optimal time of conversion  of managed forest to agriculture, or vice versa, is
determined by the condition of equal instantaneous profits in both lan  uses:
"(tel  = rAtvt'  (4)
where t* is the optimal conversion  time. Solving  the total derivative  of (4)  with respect to
kI,  c, and r for dte/dk  d/Mdd,  and dt/dr,  respectively,  gives  the comparative statics
effects. If profits from managed forests are  expected to  rise faster than  profits from
agriculture (ie,  >  7J  then t,  marks the time of optimal conversion  from agriculture to
managed forstry.  With the assumptions  on profit functions made above:
WO'  =  i  <  O
di  NC,  >  0  (5)
df  x£-4
dt Cm  ,  _ 
dJr 
14 however,  <t  C it  (in  this case,  t,  marks the time of optimal conversion  from managed
forestry  to agriculture),  then all signs  are reversed (d*/dk  > 0, dtVidJf C 0, and dt*/dr
<0).
Land Use Changes
Combining these results, a  timber price  level increase advances logging of
unmanaged forest  and conveuison  to other uses (mcluding  managed forests),  advances the
conversion of land from agrculture to managed forests  and delays the conversion  from
managed forest to agriculture.  Since  these  results  hold for land in any class,  an unexpectedEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  27
increase in the timber price path leads  to a reduction of the area under unmanaged forests
and an increase of the area under managed forest at any time after the shock. Other
results include an increase  in unmanaged forests  with increase in logging  costs (or a land-
based logging  fee),  and a reduction in unmanaged forests with an increase  in the decision
makers' discount rate if logging  is profitable.  The results of the analysis  are summarized
in Table I (see  page 10).
Variable Loeging Effort
The foregoing simple model with constant levels of effort in logging and forest
management produces several unambiguous comparative statics results. However, the
underlying assumption of constant effort  is unrealistic.  The following  model incorporates
effort as an additional decision variable in logging as well as forest management. This
model, hence,. addresses  the question  of substitutability  of other inputfactors such as labor
and  capital for forest land.  Evidence of widely varying levels of logging waste and
processing efficiency  indicate the importance of this analysis. It wil be shown that the
effects  of some policy interventions hold only under some additional conditions on the
forestry  production function,  f. Hence, this analysis  directs attention to further analysis of
the ernpirical  parameters that, if estimated, would  allow  a less  ambiguous  prediction of the
mpact of policy  interventions.
The modified notation in this model includes:
the effort in logging  unmanaged forest;
el*  the profit maximizing level of effort in logging unmanaged forests;
w  the factor price of effort;
f (e'  the timber harvest as a function of the logging effort;
7e(k,t)  the profit function for logging unmanaged forest,
7e(c,t)  = f(e)p(k,t)  - e'w- c';
the effort in managed forestry;28  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
ers  the profit maximizing level of effort in managed forests;
fef)  the timber harvest as a function of the effort in managed forests;
e(k,t)  the profit function for managed forests  is 7TQc,t)  - (eI'pQc,t) - eSw  - cr.
Land owners maximize the present value of their land by choice of logging time,
and effort in logging as well as forestry:
max  LP  = e-" ZI(k,t) + f  nc(t'sk)ds  (6)
subject to the condition max LPV >  0. If max LPV ￿  0,  logging would not take place
within finite time. The profit maximizing  logging time, and levels  of effort are functions
of all parameters, determined by the following  first order conditions:
LI'V  =  8P  =,  124(t)  }-rz'(tk) -txt'¶1  =  0
LPVs = -PkY=  = e  p(t=)  '=_ -0
The only price change considered  is a price level change ().  Most of the results
from the model with constant effort hold in this model as well i.e. an increase in the
discount  rate increases logging  of unmanaged forests  if the latter is sufficiently  profitable,
and an increase in the costs of either logging  or managing forests increases the area of
-zunmanaged  forest.  The deraton  of the comparative stcs  results is provided in the
AppendiT and  cntains  tie  following  result for the margin of unMranaged  forests and
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>  o  i  -f  f  P
di"'  W:2  rp  (8)
d_  <  O  f'  "f  I  Pt
erp
Hence, the result that deforestation  proceeds more rapidly with higher timber
prices does not hold unambiguously,  and an additional condition on  the production
function is required to hold for this effect.  At least theoretically,  a rise in the timber price
level can lead to a rising appreciation of the timber stock that more than offsets the
increase  in foregone  harvest  prfirts. This can happen if the profit  function is highly  convex
in the ilmber price and the increase in profits with higher prices  is relatively  low (i.e., if
L  is dose to zero, and  f  is small).  In this case,  logging  profits  wull  rise faster over  time at
a higher price level.  As a result, it could become  profitable  to delay logging.
In order to analyze the robustness  of this paper's main result, it is important to
gain some appreciation whether the condition for dtr/dk  c  0 is likely  to be met. If the
rate of timber price increase was higher than r, no timber would currently  be harvested
at all. Hence it is reasonable to assume that:
0 <S  <  1  (9)
rp
Hence, with (8)  and (9):
__  >  1  - - < 0  (10)
This condition  is also sufficient  to establish  earlier logging  with price level  increases  at the
margin of unmanaged and managed forest  (see  appendix).  Now consider  a Cobb-Douglas
production function:30  Economic  Parameters of Deforestation
fh,e)  =  eah  w  itho  < a <l
where h is the amount of land used for logging.  With h normalized  to }:
q 4 9a(12) INI  =  _  1 1, c
f  > Pt  ff  a  <  I
QS2  pr
pr
Historical timber price time series  indicate real rates of price increase  of only one to two
percent per annum. Assuming  a future price increase  of one percent and a discount  rate
of 5%, the results  of the constant-effort  model would hold for any a < 0.833. With a
Cobb-Douglas  production function and competitive  mnarkets,  a would be the share of
timber revenues spent on all logging costs including labor and capital but cxcluding
timber rents and royalties).  From available  data, it seems  unlikely  that a share as large as
83% of log revenues  would  be spent on logging  costs. Similar analysis  can be performed
for other functional specifications  of £ The analysis would suggest that most of the
comparative statics results of the  constant effort model continue to  hold. Clearly,
additional empirical  analysis  of the production function would be helpful to verify this
claim.
An additional result can be established  for any timber price increase, k", and
without any additional condition on the production functions:  LPV is increasing  in the
timber price (since  the profit  function  is increasing  in output prices).  Therefore,  maximized
LPV  increases  with any increase  in the timber price  path. Thus, if max LPV c O (and this
piece of land is not logged  in finite time),  also with any timber price reduction LPV < 0.
Hence, with a lower timber price path, there is no unmanaged forest that is ultimately
converted that would  not also have been converted with higher prices. However, some
lands that would  ultimately  be logged  under higher prices  may not be logged  at all underEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  31
lower prices.  Hence,  the  unmanaged  forest  that  will ultimately be  converted is
unamnbiguously  reduced under lower timber prices.
The first order conditions  for the transition from managed forestry to agriculture
or vice  versa are:
79"n  -f(kc7)=  0
(13)
p(k,t)-t-w=  O
The comparative static results are listed in the Appendix.
Combining these results,  an increase in the timber price path moves outward the
frontier at which unmanaged forests remain unlogged in finite time. An increase in the
level of the timber price path also advances the logging  time of unmanaged forests and
conversion to other uses under condition (B)  on all lands that ultimately wili be logged.
The other results of the model with fixed efforts in logging and forest management hold
with some additional restrictions.
Open Access  Scenario
If access to the unmanaged forest is open and property rights are acquired by
cleawing  and cultivating  land, logging does not take place at the profit maximizing time
but as soon as the profits from logging plus the present value of profits  from subsequent
cultivation  are zero. This approach is based on the assumption  that all land with positive
conversion profits is already logged.  The condition that determines logging time is:32  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
LPV = x:(t,t)  + f  e-*1'Jxc(kts)d, = 0  (14)
The conditions for optimal effort in logging  and managed forestry are the same as in the
previous  case with secure property rights:
LPV.  aLV  e=  c[(O)  cP-w]  0  (S
LpV  =  = Cjp(±e  -WIcQ  (15)
&L  afc'  I
The comparative statics results can be formally derived, similar to the case of secure
property rights. For the open access  case the algebra is tedious but the results are rather
obvious.  Therfore, the formal derivation of the following  comparative  statics  result is not
shown here:
-t  (16)
Under open access any type of timber price increase advances the logging time. This
becomes obvious  by observing  that LPV in (14)  is increasing in te  and k (it,  > 0 and  7e,
> O are assumecd,  i  >  , 2e  2 0 became profit functions are increasing  in output price).
Therefore, any increase in k has to be offset  by a reduction of e,  or vice versa, in order
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Appendix  to  Section  4:  Derivation  of  Comparative  Statics  Results
In this appendix, a price shock k refers to a change in the level of the timber price path.
The Hessian matrix, H, of the maximization problem (6) is:
LPV,  LPV,,  1P¢;
Lpvtt  LPV  c  1
H.  LPVSCi  LPVc  J  LPVfC 4 (17)
LPV,A,  LPVijCI  LPVCJt,
The matrix of comparative statics effects,  B, is:
dt  dt  dt  dt  dt
d  dwdc  'dcf
B  de1 de  de  1  de'  '  (18)
_T  4w&  dc'  ,kf
dedef  def def  def
dA  dr  4w  dc'  dcf
Let the matrix R be:
[-LPC  -LPV,,  -LPVc,  -LPVgc.  -LPVgCi]
-LPY,,  -LPr,,,  -LPV,,,  -LPVf,¢  -LPVfe4
With the implicit  function theorem, HB = R. Then, with Crameres  rule:
b  irl  (20)
vIBI
where bij is the element ij  of the matrix B, and  I  1 -I  denotes the deteminant  of the
matrix H with column i replaced by column  j  of matrx  R.34  Economic Parameters of Deforestaion
Comparativ  static effects  at the margin of unmanaged-fnrest  and agriculture
At the margin of unmanaged forests with agriculture, the variablcs related to
managed forestry  are irrelevant  to the maximization  problem.  Then, the last rows  and last
columns of  matrices H, B and, R, respectively,  can be deleted.
Now H is a symmetric  2 x 2 matrix. The sufficient  second order condition is that
H is negative definite. This implies I  H I >  0 (see  Chiang 1984, p. 325). Hence, the sign
of b1 equals the sign of I  I.  Simplifications  with the first order conditions yield:
>  o  i  - 4 /cZ<  Pt
lilA  = (rf'f,,pp,  + (4p,OPd/cP(n)  |t  p
< 0  f  -ml  fI  >Pt
q:S2  rp
JH4 =  pfw'  jpg-t)/rcxp(2rt)  {  0  if  g  > f'Pt 1
< 0  we < J'P,,  (21)
>  O  -/.Cl  > P,
I,fI = -(eIrp#,'+fh,I,ep(2nt)  .4  rp
< 0  eV<  p
rp
lH,sj  =  -rpfw/epC2)  >  0
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INH,k  =  (tI,zcpkfpWpd/ezp(2Tt)  >  0
W.1I  =  p-Cc  P-f'p)/rexp(2ft)  { :0  i  xcf < flp,  (22)
JH,"  =  (fxp-xc+rp,(e'fj¶ 4 -f'))exp(2rt)  c  (
JHIsij = rp/cx7p(2n)  >  0
Comparative static effects  at the margin of unmanaged and managed forest
Here, H is a symmetric  3 x 3 matrix. The sufficient  second order condition is that
H is negative definite. This implies I  H I < 0 (see Chiang 1984, p. 325). Hence, the sign
of b, is opposite of the sign of 1  H; 1  .Standard simplifications  yield the following  signs:
>0  - (""Fcr)  c  it
tfy  ~rp
beakt  <  0/'  LiL<fEi~2  crdr)  > P1
*f  > 0  i  (1-rt)i+t(f'p,  < txf+exp(-rd)f tpd
b  r  |  <  0  if  (1 -rt)c'+tf'p,  > tif+exp(-ra)ffpd  (23)
>0  if  -fe(/+  e  > Pt
fi, r  TI,
btie
if  -fl  Of  i  - /eJ  <  -Pt 7  (~  rp
b,s.:  >  0
b,;I,  >  0
and:36  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
{ :  o  f+r;: 'f/.-
*  0  if  Cf+r  >f/r-) {  >  0  f  (1 -rt):':tf  p,  < t7f+cexp(-rd)ffpd
b,i.r,bfr  <  0  f  (1-rt)xIttfp,  >  t:if+ex(-rd)ffpd  (24)
b,,,,,  b,t,  ?
b.ia.bbzf.  >  0
b.  f, b.  >  0
Comparative static effects  at the margin of managed forest and agriculture
The comparative statics results are obtained in the standard way from the total
differcntials of (13).  All signs are based on -et <  , (shift  from agriculture to managed
forestry). For shifts from managed forestry to agriculture, all signs are reversed:
dtC  e_  cp(-drfPk  c  - f.P2Et  <0
d,c-  exp(-dr)dfp  >o  def>  =  d0.  {  ^  t  > 0
dr  af,_  dr  (c___a
-i'  _____  c  > 0  4  =i-cxp(drf'  ?  (25)
dw  =IX  dw  puCgxtt
dt  -*  1  d0f  ep(dr)(f4-74)+ffpg  > 0
_  ~  O  .>_0
dcf  &f  p0f,ax-
&C  d-  OM  P/';  --  >  O
ctf  4-n,a  df a  pf.  (7c -16Economic Parameters of Deforestation  37
5. A Land Use Simulation Model with Endogenous Timber  Prices
The following  simulation model has the same structure as the theoretical model
in section 4. That  model was based on an exogenous timber price path and, hence, on
the assumption that timber output would  not influence timber prices. The objective  of the
simulation model in this section, on the other hand, is to analyze dynamic land use in a
situation in which timber prices respond to supply, as it would be expected, for example,
for a  local fuelwood market or for a large timber-exporting country. In  addition, this
section demonstrates that the price path assumption made in section 4 (declining  rate of
timber price increases)  is consistent with the equilibrium price path for timber from mining
unmanaged forests with managed forests  available as a back-stop.  Finally, the simulations
illustrate the theoretical results of section 3 and could be used together with the required
locational data to estimate deforestation effects  in specific  real-life policy situations.
The  simulation model will endogenize the timber price  path. This  will make
possible the  evaluation of policies that  have indirect effects on  the  timber price. For
example, a land-based logging fee or the increase in plantation  productivity would be
likely to have effects  on the tii_ber price path that could not be captured by the model
in section 4. This model tries to fill the gap between micro-forest models that focus on the
optimal rotation period and input mix on a given piece of land and large scale, often
global models of the forest sector (see  for example Kallio, Dykstra and Binldey 1987)  that
do not allow the type of regional analysis  required for understanding the effects  of specific
local policy interventions. The model is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Its purpose
is to  predict the  impacts of a project  or policy on the  forest sector, rather than  to
determine the optimal level of forest cover or the costs and benefits of changes in the
forest cover.
Some of  the  complexities  of forest economics result from the dual nature of a
standing forest as final output as well as productive capital. This  model maintains the38  Economic  Parameters of Deforestation
approach of the model in section  4 by distinguishing  between unmanaged (or old-growth)
forests and  managed  forests (or forest plantations). Evel.  though this  dichotomy is
somewhat unrealistic, the distinction not only simplifies  the  analysis greatly but also
clarifies  the often opposite impact of a policy on managed versus uuimanaged  forests.
Moreover,  the distinction  allows  more precise  analysis  of policy  impacts on different  types
of forested land. For example, if conservation  of biodiversity  is of greatest concem, the
analysis  would  be focussed  on logging  of old-growth  forest. If, on the other hand, global
warming is concerned, the analysis  would  focus on total biomass  in old-growth  forests  as
well  as plantations.
The Model
The  model  is based on  a  simple choice between land  uses for agriculture,
unmanaged and managed forests.  Unmanaged forest  is modelled  as a mine, e.g. the forest
is mature and no more growth in timber is occurring. Managed forests, on the other
hand, are modelled as a crop with constant growth and continuous  harvest. The model
does not consider non-timber products of the forest. This  approach is based on  the
assumption  that logging  decisions  are made independent of non-timber uses of the forest.
This in no way suggests  that non-timber uses of the forest are less  important. However,
their importance would have to  be reflected in  a normative, rather than the present
positive  model.
The model simulates  the market for timber  as a single  homogenous  forest  product.
There are a finite number of periods t = 1,...,T. Supply of timber in any one period is
determined by a land use model in which decision makers maximize profits from their
piece of land by choice of land use and production inputs. Decision makers are profit
maximizing  owners of the land with perfect foresight.  The timber market is competitive.
Hence, land owners treat timber prices as exogenous.Economic Parameters of Deforestation  39
Let Qbe  the set of all land classes.  At any time t, Qis partitioned into five subsets
according to the current use of a parcel of land. These subsets are A, for land under
agriculture cultivation,  P, for land under managed forests (plantation) Ip for land left idle,
1,  for unmanaged  forests that  are  logged at  time  t,  and  F, for land  covered  with
unmanaged forcst. Land classes are  denoted by a location index, d, that  describes all
differences  between land classes.  d can be a vector, however, in the simple model analyzed
here, d is a scalar that can be thought of as distance from a market or transport costs with
d  =  {1,2,3,...,D}. At  time  0,  all  land  is covered by  unmanaged  forest.  After the
unmanaged forest is logged in land class d, the owner faces the following profit functions
for altemative land uses in each period.
For agricultural activities:
,wd) = r-  c,(d)  (26)
wherc r, is the exogenous revenue from agricultural products grown on one unit of land
and c,(d) is the cost of agriculture on land in class d with dc/dd  >  0.
For tree plantations:
71a)  =  pt-c,(a)]iy,(e)-we  (27)
where yp(e,j is the annual timber yield as a function of effort CF,  (dyp/dep  >  0, d2yp/dep 2
< 0), cp(d)  is the per unit cost of transporting timber, and w is the wage rate. The optimal
level of effort, ep,*,  is determined by the first order condition:
[  - c  (ddy, (ej  w  (28)
Let  xde
Letx;(d) denote the profit from the profit maximizing activity on land of class d:!40  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
zfd)a9  = AMatx,,,(&OI,xp,jc4),OJ  (29)
At the time a unit of logging, the land owner receives the one-time profit:
xz 1(d) = [p,-cqAdOy/e,)  -wce  (30)
where y.(e) is the timber yield as a function of effort es  (dy/d;, > 0, d'y/dej2 < 0), cj(d) is
the per unit cost of transporting timber, and w is the  wage rate. The optimal level of
effort, ej', is detenmined  by the first order condition:
fpt -cAd)9 dy/el,)  =  (31)
Now, the owner determines the opDmal  time of logging, t(d), at which the present
value of all profits from a piece of land is maximized:
Ix  T  xz,(d)  x  T  O)
arp=  +E  m...L...  fiax> 
tfi  a(  1+lf  . (i-,  1  (1+)'  a-ts'  (1+O.  (32)
a  z~~~~~~~x  T  -4iSO max  J  +  s  _  0 !s. (1  (+  a-t.1+1  l+f
where i is the owners  discount rate, and t,(d)  = ao means that the forest in land class d is
never logged.
Let d, denote land of cls  d at time L  Then profit maximizing land use over time
is completely described by the following  partition of all land classes at all times t:Economic Parameters of Deforestation  41
Fe  i  ti/d)  > t
Lt  ff ti(d) = t
d, e  It  iftd  < tA  .(a)  s  O  ,A  ,^(d)5O  . (33)
Ptg  tild) c t A  %,,(d)  > O  A 7coa)  x  s(a)
A,  f  Vtid)  c  t  rA2 c(d  >  flOA  (d)  > x(gd)
Let q(d)  be the quantity of land in each land class,  then timber supply, S. is given
by the sum of production of timber from logging and plantations for each period:
s, = E  q(d)y(ej,(dA)) +E-  q(dy,(;(d,t))
dEE  de'
The model is dosed by assuming a denand  function for timber in period t, x. x
is a function of timber price, pt and t,
= xs  p,)  (35)
The model is solved by determining the equilibrium price path for timber that leads to
market clearing in all periods.
Implementation and Simulation Results
The implementation of  the model  is based on numerical simulation of  the modelled
timber market  The market clearing price path is determined by a Mathematica program
through an iterative procedure (see the appendix to this section). Once the equilibrium
price path is found, land use over time is calculated from the timber supply model.
For  the numerical simulations, the following functional forms are used in  the
model:  Demand:  x=k 1 p-' Logging:  y1 =k 2(1-exp[-kseJ).  Plantation:  yX,k,Sqrt(e.)  ki, kI, 1(3,42  ;Economic  Parameters of Deforestation
and k1  are constants. Several simulations  were run for hypothetical parameter values and
variations from the base case parameters that represent generic unanticpated  shocks.  The
parameter values used in the simulations are listed in the Mathematica program in the
appendix. The  parameter  values were chosen to  represent  a  broad  mix of relative
profitability of logging unmanaged  forests, managed  forests and  agriculture.  Other
parameter values were tried and yidded the same qualitative results as presented below.
The chosen parameter values, however,  yielded continuous land use patterns that make
the main results easier to convey graphically. Note that if land classes include not only
transportation costs but also other locational parameters, land classes adjacent in the
diagrams need not be geographically  adjacent.
The equilibrium timber price path and resulting  profit maximizing land use in the
base case scenario are shown in Figure 5. Note that in this and all other simulations, the
resulting equilibrium price path for timber, shows the characteristic of declining rates of
increase, as it was assumed for the analysis in  section 2 (p, >  0, p,  <  0). Intensity of
logging and managing forests increases  in the current timber price and decreases in site
specific production costs. Hence, a  scenario with  a higher price path  implies higher
intensity in logging and managing forest at the same location, compared to the base case,
and vice versa.
The following paragraphs describe the effect that  various modifications in the
economic  parameters have on the land use patterns compared to the base case  introduced
above. For simplicity, all simulations are based on a modification of the initial model
parameters. Altematively, an unanticipated shock could be imposed at a later time. The
expected qualitative outcome would be the same. The focus of the following  discussion  is
on the differences  in land use patterns over time between the base case and the modified
scenarios. These differences  are the effects  that changes in the economic paraneters  at
time zero have on land use, and are, thus, the focus of interestEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  43
The effect of timber price path changes on land use can be analyzed in several
ways. The first scenario analyzed imposes a timber tax of 10 monctary units (about 40
percent of the steady statc price in the base case). Hence, the model is run to clear the
markets with consumer prices set 10 units higher than producer prices. The resulting drop
in producer prices is equivalent to the cffects of log-export rcstrictions. This tax leads to
a reduction in the producer price compared to the basc casc that is shown in Figure 6.
Consistent with the results of the analysis in section 4, the reduced producer price path
leads to a reduction in logging of unmanaged forests and a decrease in the area with
managed forests. Hence, the area with unmanaged forests increases, while the arca with
managed forests decreases. Agriculture contracts at the margin with unmanaged forests
and expands at the margin with managed forests.
The effects of a logging fee per area of unmanaged forest is shown in Figure 7.
Such a fee could be rationalized as a Pigouvian tax for the extemal benefits from the
standing natural forest. The results of such a fee are a reduction in logging of unmanaged
forests.  This reduction in logging leads to a reduction in managed forests at the extensive
margin. Because of the low intensity of forestry at the extensive margin, the fee leads to
a relatively small reduction in timber output after the steady state is reached. Timber
prces  would be somewhat higher than  in  the  base case, and  the  margin  between
agriculture and managed forests would shift in favor of managed forests.
Figure 8 shows  the case of transportation costs  for timber and agricultural products
reduced  by  10  percent.  With  the  assumed  parameter  values,  this  reduction  in
transportation cost benefits agriculture more than forestry. Within agriculture or forestry
it reduces costs more for land dasses with a higher index number  (representing  further
distance).  As a result, a reduction in transportation costs  leads to increased pressure on the
margin and an expansion of agriculture and managed forest at the expense of unmanaged
forest. The  effect of road  building on the  timber price  path and  logging intensity is44  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
ambiguous since  the reduction in transportation unit costs  and the increase in distancc due
to increased logging operate in opposite directions.
An increase in agricultural productivity  is modelled as a one-third increase of the
agricultural output quantity  that  can be sold at  a fixed price. This  assumes infinite
elasticity of the demand for the agricultural product, which could be expected for the
exports of a homogenous cash crop from a small country. As shown in Migure 9, the
increase in yields would lead to an increase in the agricultural area. The resulting timber
price increase would shift the managed forest area into the area of unmanaged forests,
which would decline.  Of course, these effects  depend on the assumed characteristics  of the
agricultural market. If, in the other extreme, demand for the agricultural product was
totally inelastic (i.e. for a subsistence  crop), the agriculture area would decline with yield
increases, the timber price would fail, and the pressure on unmanaged forests would be
reduced.
Figurc 10 shows a situation in which no managed forestry exists. This scenario
helps understand the effect  of forest plantations on urunanaged  forests. Without managed
forests, timber is a non-renewable resource with increasing extraction costs. As a result,
the price path shows  an increasing rate of price increase.  In the short-run, the introduction
of managed forests  increases logging of unmanaged forests since managed forests create
additional demand for land. The long-run effect,  however, is different.  Without managed
forests, timber prices would rise until all unmanaged forests arc (at least asymptotically)
depleted. With managed forests, a cap is put on the rise of timber prices at the level at
which all demand can be supplied  from managed forests.  When this price level  is reached,
it will not be profitable to log remaining unmanaged forests. Hence, the introduction of
managed forests increases the area of unmanaged forests that is ultimately preserved.
A scenario of quadrupling the decision  maker's discount rate is presented in order
to analyze the effects  of different  tenure regimes on land use patterns. Figure 11 shows  theEconomic Parameters of Deforestation  45
effects of an increased discount ratc that could result from a reduced time horizon or
increased tenure uncertainty. The variation from the base case is surprisingly small in this
scenario. The agriculture area expands  into the managed forest area because timber prices
are lower and  the  retums to forcstry decline relative to agriculture due to the  longer
growth period for trees. However, logging of unmanaged forests increases only slightly
with a higher discount rate. With the assumed parameter values, timber rents at the
margin of unmanaged forests are relatively low, or even negative, since the distance from
the center is high. Hence, clearing land is an investment that is less profitable with a
higher discount rate. This simulation  result indicates that there arc some parameter values
at which deforestation is driven by the timber price/transport  cost interaction and may
be relatively unaffected by long-term tenure questions. Under the assumptions made,
increasing tenure security alone would not drastically reduce deforestation.
The last scenario compares the base case with an open access  scenario. Figure 12
shows this scenario. Logging of unmanaged forests is advanced drastically since it occurs
as soon as  conversion profits are positive- In  the  long-run, however, the  remaining
unmanaged forest is the same with open access and secure property rights since in both
cases all lands with positive conversion profits will ultimately be logged. Under  open
access, the timber price is initially lower (because of excessive  supply  from still abundant
forests), later higher (because  excessive  logging leads to higher transportation costs) and
finally equal to the secure property rights case. Note, that in the open access case it is
assumed that property rights are established once the unmanaged forest is logged.46  Economic Parameters of Dcforestation
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(* program control variables  '1
dmax-30u  (  highest land index, d '1
dateps-20:  I  initial number of land index increments  J
tsteps-207  P  number a! time periods  *
thresh - 5:  P  tolerated  excessdemand  '3
adj - 0.006:  C' initial price adjustment  factor  J)
iterations  - aO  r'  set iteration  counter ')
propertyrights  - True;
nonpositive[x_l  Mlntx,01;
(4  economic  variables  *)
iagx-60  p  initial agricultural output quantity  )
agx-60;  C' initial agricultural output quantity  )
aqel-li  C'  price  elasticity  for agricultural  demand 1)
arevenue-agx*(iagx/agx)(1/agqel):
p  gross  revenue from land in agriculture  '
a-5i  C' cost coefficient  for agriculture  '3
pproduction-10;  C'  plantation  productivity  factor  )
b-l;  C'  plantation  cost factor *'
fstock-28:  P  timber stock in old growth  forest '2
ioyofactor  - 501
1' productivity  factor of effort  in logging  21
c-1.3:  ' logging cost factor  )
r-.5;  ('  discount  rate  )
w  - 200;  C'  wage  rate ')
price - Table[30,(i,tsteps)1;
(r timber price  'I
lltax - 1;  P  logging tax per land unit '3
lttax - 0;  Ir logging tax per timber unit  2
pltax - O;  (0 plantation tax per land unit  '
pttax - =;  (0 plantation tax per timber unit  'I
demand :-  Table[lO000(pricel(ill)'A(l-1,fi,tsteps-l1I;
p  timber  demand  )
acost[d_  D- a*du
C'  per-land  transport  cost of agriculture  '3
pcost[d_I  :-  b'd;
p  d  per-timber  transport  cost of plantation  "3
fcost[d ] :  c'd;
- per-timber  transport  cost  of  logging  I
plantprod[e_]  := Sqrt[e]  pproduction;
-4 plantation  output  as  function  of  effort  *1
plantprof(d_,p_,eg_I :=  E^C-r)C(Cp  - pcost(d]  - pttax)  *  plantprod[e]  - a  *  a
- pltax);
(* plantation profit  J
templ - D[plantproffd,p,el,e];
C' first derivative  of profits  ')
temp3 - Simplify[e  /.First[Solve[templ==O,e]]J;
(I  profit masximizing effort in plantations  )
temp2 - D[templ,ej  /.  e->temp3;
I' second derivative  of profits 'I
logprod[e  ,q_j :-  Cl-EC-qle))  fstock;
-( logging output as function of effort I)
logprof(d_,p  e_, :-  ((p  - pcost[d]  - lttax) '  logprod[e,Logefactorl  -
w  '  a -Tiltax);
C' logging profit I
temp4 =  D(logprof[d,p,e],eJ;
C' first derivative of profits  I
temp6 =  Simplify[e  /.First[Solve[temp4=O,e]J1;Economic Parameters of Deforestation  55
(*  profit  maximizing  effort  in  logging )
tempS  - D[temp4,el  /. e->temp6a
(*  second  derivative  of profits  *)
excessdemand  - TableIlOOOO,(i,tsteps-l1l
adjthresh  - fstackldmaxfdstepsl.5;
d - dincr'dmax/dsteps;
While(MaxUAbs[N[excesdemmandlll>threfh  Ba  iterations  <  100,(
C*  reducing  d spacing  if excesademand  below  adjthresh  '1
If[Max(Abs[N[excessdemandl]lc-adjthresh,
d3teps-dateps*2;
adjthresh  - fstockdmax/dstepr*l.5,
d - dincrodmax/dstepslg
C'  Calculation  of profits  and optimal  effort  for  different  land  uses 1
agriculture  - N[Table[arevenue  - acost[d],
(dincr,dstepsl,(t,tuteps)11;
(*  d't  matrix  of profits  from  agriculture 1
plantation  - N(Tablet
ntemp2  - Evaluate[temp2  /. p->price[tlt]];
effort  - Evaluate(temp3  /. p->price[[tl]]]





(*  dIt'2  matrix  of  profits  and optimal  effort  in plantation  '2
logging  q  NtTable[
ntemp5  - Evaluatettemp5  /.  p->priceI[t1]]s
faffort  - Evaluate[temp6  I.  p->price[[t]J]j
If[Sign(Re[ntemp5J]---1  aL  Im(N[feffort]]--  La
Sign[ReCN(feffort]  ] ]1,
{logprof(d,price([t  ],foffortj,
feffort),(-lltax,Ol],
(dincr.dstepsl  ,  {t,tsteps)  I];
(t d't'2  mPtrix  of profits  and optimal  effort  in logging  )
(  Present  value  of annual  profits  of highest  value cultivation  fl
pvcprofit  - N[Table[Max[O,Part[agriculture,dincr,t],
Part(plantation,dincr,t,l]]/((l+r)"tJ,
(dincr,dsteps),(t,tsteps)]];
(*  Highest  value  cultivation  *)
cultivation  - N?Table[Which(Part[agriculture.dincr.tI<-0  La
Part(plantation.dincr.t,11C-0.5  ('  idle '),
Part[agriculture,dincr,t]<-Part[plantation,dincr.t.11,1  (*  plantation  tl2.
Pazt[agriculture,dincr,t]>Part[plantation,dincr,t.11,3  (*agriculture  *1)].
[dincr,dsteps},lt,tstepsa]];
C'  Present  value of logging  +  cultivating  highest  value thereafter  *)




1*  d vector  of  optimal  time for logging  '2
If[propertyrights,
logtime  - N[Flatten(Table  [If[ax(Part(loggingpv,dincr]]>O,
Last[Position[Part[loggingpv,dincri,
Max[Parttloggingpv,dincr]  11,
titeps+ili(dincr,dsteps)]]),56  Economic Parameters of Deforestation
logtime  - N(Flatten(Table[IfIKax[Part[loggingpv,dincr]]>-O,
First(Position[(aptnonpositive,Part[loggingpv,dincr],(11],
0]],tstepsz+  1,dincr,dsteps3]]]
(*  d't matrix  of optimal  land  use *)
landuse  - N[Table[WhichItCPartIlogtime,dincr],4  (*  forest  '3,




C'  t  vector  of tinber  supply  *3






excessdemandold  - excessdemand;
excessdemand  - Nldemand-supply];
priceold  - N(price,51I
iterationa  - iterations+ls
C'  deternining  response  of excessdemand  to previous  iteration's  price
change,  and adjusting  price  adjustment  factor 'adj'  '3
If[iterations>l,
elast  - N[Sum[If[Abs[excessdemandold[(t]llcadjthresh/2,1,
Abs[Cexcessdemand[Itl]-excesademandoldl[tl])/
excessademandold[[tij]],{t,ttteps-l11/(tatepa-1)],
elast  - Il
Which[elast>l,adj-adj/2,elast<O.5,adj-adj*2J;
(C  calculating  timber  price for  next iteration  *)








1]  (*  Close  WHILE loopp '3
olddsteps  - duteps;
oldlogtime  - logtimes
oldlanduse  - landuse:
(*  Shcw  graph  of land  use over  timber  price:  olive-forest,
gray-idle,  green-plantation,  brown-agriculture,  black-
logging  *I










C'  graph  of  timber  supply  '3Economic Parameters of Deforestation  57
BarChart[aupply]
(*  Graph  of  timber  price  '3
LiatPlot(prica,PlotJoined->TrueI
Modifications  from  above  program  for  alternative  se  nario:
tumber  Tax Came
demand  :- Table[lOOO*Cpricet[ill-1O)VC-l),(i.tsteps-l)JI
Logging  Fee Came
Iltax - 250;




gprincultra  Progres  Case
iagxeO;  J
agx-8O
No  Plantation  Case
pproduction-0.001;
My~opia Case
pe  AcOeRS  Cas
propertyrights  - False;58  Economic Parameters of Deforestaion
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